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I. Introduction.
This paper extends the existing theory and empirical investigation of unitization
contracts.  It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibility and self-enforcement and
the bargaining problems faced in achieving viable, long-term contracts.  Essential contract
elements are identified, and the conditions that promote their inclusion in unit agreements are
described.   Less complete and effective arrangements are introduced and linked to specific
geological and market conditions that complicate bargaining.  Hypotheses are derived about
when complete unit contracts will be observed and about the rent-dissipating behavior that
will occur when alternative arrangements are adopted.  The empirical investigation makes use
of the largest data set of unitization contracts compiled to date—60 unit contracts in the
United States and Canada.
We argue that if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that
are the same as their cost shares, the contract will be incentive compatible.  This follows
because the allocation formula makes each party a claimant to the unit’s net profits and as
such, motivates them to support a production plan that maximizes unit profits.  Our survey of
units that have only one production phase and that are relatively homogeneous (no clustering
of oil and gas in separate parts of the reservoir) reveals that such equal sharing rules are
always found and they appear to encourage the parties to behave optimally.  The contracts are
simple, do not require detailed provisions to address potentially serious moral hazard
problems, and conflicts over production and investment are minimized. The unit operator
develops the field and administers the contract.  In more complex units with multiple
production phases and/or separate concentrations of oil and gas (gas cap) we argue that the
equal sharing rule still is necessary for effective unitization.  Negotiating conditions, however,3
are more complicated and these affect the ability of the parties to reach agreement on the
required allocation formula. In multi-phase units, we find equal cost and production shares
within each phase, but not across phases.  We show that this condition can still lead to optimal
behavior among the parties if there is a pre-set trigger for shifting from one production phase
to the next.   For gas cap units, however, we generally do not find the equal sharing rule.
Although the parties have incentives to draft incentive-compatible contracts, they may not be
able to do so.  Conflicts and rent dissipation follow as illustrated by the case of the Prudhoe
Bay Unit.
Our contribution is useful because it describes the desirable contract rules for avoiding
moral hazard.  It also shows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficult
situations through the use of a trigger.  Finally, the analysis reveals the cases where complete
unitization contracts are unlikely to be written.
Unitization contracts have been of interest to scholars in transactions costs economics,
political economy, and the law for some time.  Unitization is the most straightforward
solution to a serious common-pool problem in oil and gas production. Under the common-law
rule of capture, private property rights to hydrocarbons are assigned only upon extraction.
Production rights are granted to firms through leases from those who hold the mineral rights,
often landowners.  Each of the producing firms has an incentive to maximize the economic
value of its leases, rather than that of the hydrocarbon reservoir as a whole.  As firms compete
for migratory oil and gas they dissipate reservoir rents with excessive capital, too rapid
production, and lost total recovery.
1 With a complete unitization agreement among the
producers, however, a single firm is designated as the unit operator to develop the entire
reservoir.
2  The other firms share in the unit profits according to negotiated formulas.  The4
gains from agreement can be huge both from savings in capital costs and from increases in
overall production that can be from two to five times unregulated output.
3
With so much at stake, oil firms are motivated to reach agreement to form complete
units.  Yet, despite this motivation, complete unitization is much more limited than
neoclassical theory would predict (Bain, 1947, p. 29).  For instance, Libecap and Wiggins
(1985) report that as late as 1975, only 38 percent of Oklahoma production and 20 percent of
Texas production came from reservoir-wide units.  Achieving consensus on a unit contract is
difficult with agreements often completed only after years of negotiation, when many of the
efficiency losses already have occurred.  And, as we show even when unitization agreements
are reached, not all are complete, leaving the potential for various forms of competition
among owners that dissipate rents.
4
To be successful, a unit agreement must align the incentives of the oil-producing firms
over the life of the contract to maximize the economic value of the reservoir without repeated
re-contracting.
5 Unit contracts involve a number of difficult issues that have to be addressed
by negotiators.  Because remaining production often lasts 20 years or more, unit agreements
must be long term and be responsive to considerable uncertainty over future market and
geological conditions. They must allocate unit production and costs among the many firms
that otherwise would be producing from the reservoir.
6  Additionally, they must authorize
investments that may be made later to expand reservoir production, and distribute the ensuing
costs among the individual parties.
Unit contracts generally involve two documents.  One is the Unit Agreement that is
between the firms (lessees) that plan to unitize the reservoir and the property or royalty
owners (lessors).  This document describes the terms for the formation of the unit.
7 The other5
document is the Unit Operating Agreement, which is the more detailed contract among the
working interest owners (WIOs) for forming and operating the unit. It includes the
designation of the location and limits of the reservoir or formation to be unitized and the
procedures to expand the unit as necessary; a definition of key terms such as development
wells, injection wells, and test wells; the identity of the unit operator and procedures for
removal of the unit operator;  start date of the agreement; and identity of the working
interests, including their holdings (leases) on the reservoir.
Unit Operating Agreements have additional provisions that define the operating
relationships among the working interests.  These provisions include governance mechanisms
such as voting rules, notification requirements, grievance and arbitration procedures, unit
operator reporting and accounting practices, and establishment of a supervisory committee;
compensation for private capital equipment (typically, wells, pipelines, and possibly injection
plants) taken over by the unit; and the sharing formula by which produced substances, capital,
and operating costs are distributed among the working interests.  Achieving agreement on the
sharing formula is very contentious, often requiring intense negotiations with many votes
taken by the working interests on various cost and production sharing options. Indeed,
arriving at a consensus on shares is the most difficult issue faced in unit negotiations. Discord
among the negotiators can delay unitization for years or lead to an incomplete agreement.
Uncertainty and asymmetric information among the parties about unobservable lease
characteristics hinder agreement on individual lease values and corresponding unit shares.
Unit Operating Agreements also define the phases of production as primary (when
natural, subsurface pressures flush oil to the surface) and secondary (when various injection
procedures are used).  Based on engineering reports agreed to at the time the unit is6
established, the negotiating parties have some sense of how the various leases will fare in
each phase of production, and different sharing or ownership percentages may be defined for
each phase. General physical benchmarks are specified, such as a particular gas/oil ratio or
production level.  As we show, these benchmarks typically are not controversial and they play
a very important role in maintaining incentive compatibility within the unit.
8
Finally, Unit Operating Agreements describe the mechanism by which parties are
added or dropped from the unit.  If the Unit Agreement is written during exploration or early
development (when the full extent and nature of the subsurface formation are unknown)
parties may be mistakenly included or excluded from the unit.  Hence, Unit Operating
Agreements include provisions for drilling test wells to confirm hydrocarbon deposits and
justification for participation in the unit.  With these adjustments, the new (or remaining)
parties participate in production and costs according to the sharing formula.
9  These
provisions define the working structure of the unit, and they are spelled out ex ante.
10
Unit Operating Agreements contain both specific benchmarks and general terms.
Certain contingencies are laid out, primarily the sharing formula under different production
phases, and mechanisms for adding or subtracting membership.  But day-to-day operation of
the unit is left unspecified in the contract, with the unit operator bound only to a “best efforts”
standard of performance, a standard that would be costly to monitor without self-enforcing
provisions.  It is not possible ex ante to define strict performance criteria for the unit operator
because far too much remains unknown at the time the contract is written, particularly about
future reservoir geological dynamics, market conditions, and production technology.  Under
those circumstances, it is desirable to provide the unit operator with considerable latitude in
reservoir development.7
Importantly, many potential long-term contracting problems are not addressed
explicitly in Unit Operating Agreements.  For example, procedures to address potential
extortion by some parties of the value of fixed, capital assets (non-moveable wells, injection
plants, and pipelines) typically are not described.  This is a potential problem.  Hypothetically,
any working interest could engage in opportunism and extort the unit for the value of those
assets by threatening to withdraw from the agreement or otherwise hinder unit operation
unless certain extortion demands were met.
11  Also absent are discussions of how to deal with
threats by some strategically-located parties to withdraw from the unit.  Because of the nature
of hydrocarbon deposits and changes in their flow with unit production, certain lease owners
can be essential for viable unit operation because of their position on the formation.
Theoretically, a small number of strategically-positioned parties could force a re-negotiation
of the unit once it was put into place and became profitable.
These conditions could lead to opportunistic behavior and a breakdown in the unit’s
operation.  But in practice, extortion of the value of fixed assets and strategic behavior to
force a re-negotiation of the unit agreement are uncommon.  We argue that the profit-sharing
formula specified in the Unit Operating Agreement reduces the incentive of the parties to
engage in these actions.  If the sharing formula has the characteristics described below and if
it applies to all communicating hydrocarbon deposits, then each party becomes a residual
claimant to the profits from effective operation of the entire unit.  Under these circumstances,
the working interests would not want to hold up needed investment or delay new production
practices (such as drilling injection wells) in order to force a re-negotiation of the contract.
Such actions would not only reduce unit profits, but would invite similar strategic behavior by
other parties, eroding the basis for any long-term cooperation to maximize the value of the8
unit.  As such, the profit-sharing formula provides for self-enforcing cooperative behavior
among the working interests and expands what Klein (1996) refers to as the “self-enforcing
range” of the contract.
12 Accordingly, although reaching agreement on the sharing formula
involves long and costly negotiations, once established the formula reduces ex post
enforcement costs.
Our argument proceeds as follows:  In the next section, we summarize the common-
pool problem in hydrocarbon reservoirs and then show how unitization with a profit-sharing
formula having specific characteristics solves the problem.  Section III examines two
empirically-important issues that complicate agreement on the unit sharing formula--very
skewed holdings of oil and gas and multiple production phases.  Section IV presents empirical
evidence.  Section V summarizes the results and provides generalizations for understanding
the functioning of oil and gas unit agreements.
II.  The Common Pool in Oil and Gas Reservoirs and Necessary Provisions for
Complete Unit Contracts.
A.  The Common-Pool Problem.
Competitive extraction from common-pool oil and gas reservoirs generates potentially
large efficiency losses, and unitized operations can provide a remedy.
13  The particular form
of the unitization agreement, however, determines whether that remedy will be effective.
The common-pool problem arises when multiple firms extract from a reservoir where the
underlying resources are in communication via interrelated pressure gradients and resource
migration. Under these conditions, extraction by one firm affects the volume and cost of
production elsewhere within the reservoir.
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Absent any type of cooperative effort, the outcome of competitive extraction is well
known.  Each firm determines the number of wells it will drill and sets output from each well9
so as to maximize its private profits, ignoring the cost and production externalities it inflicts
on other producers.  It raises overall costs by releasing natural gas or other substances during
production, thereby reducing the underground pressures that push oil to the surface. As
pressures fall, pumping and injection of other propellants become necessary.  Further, the
firm’s production encourages migration of oil from elsewhere in the reservoir, allowing it to
extract its neighbor’s oil.  Since all firms recognize these conditions, they have incentive to
competitively drill and drain the reservoir.  Accordingly, at any point in time, individual
production decisions are made to enhance the value of firm leases rather than to maximize the
economic value of the overall reservoir.
B.  Characteristics of Complete Unit Contracts.
To avoid the loss associated with competitive extraction, the lease owners may attempt
to reach consensus on a more optimal production plan to avoid rent dissipation. There are,
however, several possible forms that unitized operations might take, and not all are equally
effective.   Under unitization the unit operator will drill wells and produce oil and natural gas
from the reservoir.  The associated costs and production are allocated among the lease owners
according to a pre-arranged sharing rule.  Negotiating an agreement on the unit-sharing rule,
however, can be particularly difficult.  But successfully addressing the common-pool problem
requires more than agreement on a sharing formula.  The allocation formula must take a
particular form in order to align incentives and insure that the unit production plan maximizes
the economic value of the reservoir.
For each lease owner a single equity share or participation factor must be adopted that
applies equally to both costs and production throughout the reservoir. If each member’s share
of production is matched by his share of expenditures over the life of the reservoir, then all10
parties will be residual claimants to the net economic profits from unit-wide production.  Each
party will be motivated by individual incentives to pursue a common plan of efficient
development.
15 Only if this condition is met can we say that the reservoir has been completely
unitized and that the common-pool problem has been remedied.
If shares are assigned in this manner during unit negotiations, maximization of the
value of the reservoir (economic efficiency) becomes a common goal at the outset.
Alternatively, if there is a wedge between the cost and production shares assigned to any
party, then the consensus will fail and conflicts emerge.  For example, if the sharing fomula
does not uniformly allocate each type of cost in the same proportion as production, certain
owners will advocate actions that would skew development in the direction of those
expenditures (e.g., injection wells) in which they carry a relatively light load—even if that is
inconsistent with maximizing the overall value of the unit.  Dissention, violation of the unit
agreement, and rent dissipation are likely results.
To resolve such disputes, some parties (typically those with the largest leases and the
most to lose) may devise side payments that restore consensus and allow development to
proceed.  Although side payments may balance interests at one particular point in time and
persuade all parties to support a common course of development, they do not assure incentive
compatibility over the remaining life of the unit.  New disputes and conflicts will emerge (and
the need for additional side payments will ultimately arise) if cost and production shares are
not made equal. Interests can easily fall out of balance as soon as circumstances (expected
prices, costs, or production possibilities) change, which they inevitably do.  Further,
efficiency losses inflicted on the unit from disagreement and non-optimal production practices
may be irreversible due to resulting changes in reservoir dynamics.  Accordingly, ex post11
efforts to align interests via side payments are not apt to be as effective as the ex ante
proportionate assignment of costs and production to each party.
Importantly, aligning incentives through a profit-sharing formula reduces the
information necessary for implementing a unit agreement.  The contract can be left relatively
simple because new information will be incorporated and plans adapted by consensus over the
life of the unit in a manner that maximizes its value and the returns to the parties.  For
example, new information about the configuration, extent, and communication of reservoirs is
revealed through production.  This knowledge may require extension or contraction of the
unit with the corresponding addition or dropping of interests from the unit.  When parties are
added or deleted, the relative position of the incumbent interests is maintained as outlined in
the initial profit-sharing formula.  Re-negotiation of the formula is not required.  Similarly,
the allocation formula is robust against unexpected changes in oil prices, costs, or recovery
methods.  The incentives of the working interest owners remain aligned (without side
payments or re-contracting) even as these features of the project are unpredictably altered.
Because each party will favor a production plan that maximizes the economic value of
the unit, execution can safely be left in the charge of a single unit operator without detailed
performance provisions or enforcement guidelines defined at the initiation of the contract.
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Any firm with a lease interest in the reservoir and the technical competence to develop it
would provide incentive-compatible management.  Beyond this, reliance on a single unit
operator reduces the transaction and coordination costs that would arise if there were multiple
unit operators and as such, further enhances the overall net value of the reservoir.
In practice, the unit operator is usually the largest lease owner on the reservoir.  This
firm has the most at stake in unitization, thus minimizing any incentive for opportunistic12
behavior that would harm other interests.  If discovered, this deception could lead to the break
down of the unit.  Supervision of the unit operator also is formally addressed in the Unit
Operating Agreement with requirements for a governing board and votes on production and
investment decisions.  The governing board is composed of the other interests, and voting
weight is defined by the profit-sharing formula, again granting those with the greatest stake in
the unit the greatest role to play in production and investment decisions.  Super-majority
voting rules are described with the requirements increasing with the significance of the issue
at hand.
17
III. Geologic/Information Problems and Alternative Unit Agreements.
Despite the attractive attributes of a complete unit contract, not all unit agreements are
written with these provisions.  Disagreements during unit negotiations can impede acceptance
of a sharing formula that aligns the incentives of the parties.  An alternative, less effective
contract can be the result. The negotiation of unit shares is burdened by uncertainty regarding
the volume and value of the assets (leases) that each party brings to the unit.  We are not
concerned here with the possibility that negotiations may simply fail, leading to the
alternative of competitive extraction.  The potential for contractual failure has been examined
elsewhere.
18  Rather, we consider the impact of certain provisions that lease owners
commonly adopt in practice to avoid contractual failure, but which subsequently alter the
fundamental structure of the unit in ways that can threaten its effectiveness.
Negotiating over unit shares amounts fundamentally to the trading of disparate assets
among the working interest owners.  Because the reservoir has distinct physical properties
that are not uniformly distributed, the respective leases generally reflect assets that differ very
much in kind, as well as quantity.  Some lease owners may have mostly gas beneath their13
leases while others have mostly oil.  In order to completely unitize the reservoir, the two sides
have to adopt (at least implicitly) agreed terms of trade by which an interest in gas is
exchanged for a compensating interest oil.  Similarly, certain parties may hold leases that
provide natural sites for production wells (e.g., high on the formation) during primary
production, while others may hold leases that are better candidates for water or gas injection
(e.g., low on the formation) during secondary production.  Again, it will be necessary for the
parties to adopt terms of trade based on the lease locations and the potential for enhanced
recovery efforts to supplement the natural reservoir drive
Through repeated negotiations, WIOs typically are capable of translating differences
in quantity of resources into ownership shares in the unit.  However, here we argue that
differences in kind are more problematic.  The basis for placing relative values on the oil and
gas assets may not be obvious to the bargaining parties.  Gas ownership presents a particular
problem.  The valuation of gas in the reservoir depends on whether it is assumed to be
marketed, as opposed to being re-injected in support of enhanced oil recovery efforts.  Due to
limited transportability in some cases, the existence of any external market for the gas may be
doubtful, especially in remote locations.  To the extent that the imputed value of gas is
speculative, WIOs may find it difficult to adopt any definite terms of trade of oil for gas and
be unable to agree on any particular distribution of equity in the unit as a whole.
The difference in kind between gas and oil is not simply imagined.  The volatility of
short-term gas price movements exceeds that of oil, at least as reflected in futures market
trading of the last several years.  Indeed, in recent years natural gas has exhibited the highest
volatility of any commodity traded on organized U.S. futures exchanges.
19  Not only are gas
values more volatile, they do not always tend to parallel movements in the value of oil.  For14
example, the correlation between the real wellhead values of gas and oil produced in the U.S.
during the past two years (monthly values) is only 38 percent.
Over the longer time spans relevant to the units included in our data base (which date
between 1938 and 1992) there were other disparities between oil and gas prices.  One was a
lack of pipeline technology of the type needed to move large volumes of remote natural gas to
major markets.  This condition meant that many natural gas markets were local, whereas oil
markets were national and international.  Another was the effect of the Federal Power
Commission’s distortive regime of price controls that held natural gas prices below market
value throughout most of the 1950s through 1970s.  Consequently, gas markets developed
differently, as Paul MacAvoy (1983, pp. 78-120) has noted, from most other raw-material and
fuel markets.  Until fairly recently, natural gas tended to be accumulated as an unwelcome by-
product in the search for oil, and to be sold at prices not much more than gathering costs.
Differences in valuing the contribution of leases during secondary versus primary
recovery operations may pose similar difficulties for the working interest owners.  The value
of leases that are strategically important to secondary recovery efforts depends very much on
the presumed effectiveness of enhanced recovery techniques.  The performance of those
techniques can vary significantly from reservoir to reservoir and can be substantiated only
through actual testing.  The relevant tests cannot be performed until the reservoir has been
developed and depleted—several years perhaps after the unit has been in operation.
Consequently, lease owners who hold a relatively large interest in primary production may be
unwilling during equity negotiations to trade a portion of that asset away if the compensation
is to take the form of an expanded interest in secondary recovery.
In sum, lack of information and differences in expectations may undermine the15
working interest owners’ ability to trade in assets that are different in kind or quantity and are
highly uncertain in value.  Such circumstances would impede the ability of the interests to
write complete unit contracts.  They are most likely to occur when there are very skewed
holdings of oil and gas or when production involves both primary and secondary recovery.
In response, the working interest owners may elect to partition the unit in a way that
isolates differences among tracts and permits them to be negotiated separately.  The simplest
example of this occurs when a reservoir is spatially partitioned into separate gas cap and oil
rim participating areas (PAs), based on the preponderance of oil or gas in various parts of the
reservoir.
20  Individual sharing formulas are then negotiated for each PA.
Under these arrangements, each working interest owner is assigned a distinct share in
the operations of the participating area, rather than the unit as a whole.  The party whose lease
overlies a relatively large share of the oil, for example, is assigned a relatively large share of
equity in the oil rim PA, and perhaps little or none of the equity in the gas cap PA.
Alternatively, a reservoir may be partitioned across time, as when production efforts are
divided into primary and secondary recovery phases, with each working interest owner
accepting distinct interests in reservoir operations during each of the two phases.  Both types
of partition (dual PA and multi-phase recovery) are quite common in the industry because
they reduce the costs of reaching initial agreement on the unit.  But they may weaken the
ability of the Unit Operating Agreement to align incentives and hence, maximize the
economic value of the reservoir.
When the reservoir is partitioned along any dimension, a boundary is created that may
incite competition for resources and for value.  The existence of such partitions may render
the unit incomplete and hence, create conflicts of interest that must be managed by the lease16
owners in order to avoid inefficient, competitive development. We now turn to the two most
common forms of partitioning, dual PA (gas cap and oil rim) units and multi-phase units to
identify where the problems are most severe.
Dual Participating Areas: Gas Cap vs. Oil Rim
Often, a reservoir will hold a large accumulation of oil with a distinct pocket of
associated gas positioned at the very top of the formation.  If individual lease holdings are
distributed unevenly across the boundaries of such a reservoir, certain lease owners may have
a disproportionately large share of the gas concentrated beneath their leases, while other
owners hold leases that are predominantly associated with oil.  If the parties are unable to
reach agreement on the relative values of these two resources, they may chose to partition the
unit into dual participating areas.  In this case, each member accepts an equity interest in the
oil rim production that is distinct from his interest in the gas cap production.  All produced
substances and costs are first allocated between the two participating areas and then assigned
to individual lease owners on the basis of equity shares within the respective PAs.  The
problematic aspect is that, when considering a lease owner’s combined stake in the unit as a
whole, production and cost shares for any one member will not necessarily coincide.
Efficient unit-wide production requires that each member’s share of the oil rim be the
same as that member’s share of the gas cap. Whenever a single reservoir is partitioned
geographically into multiple participating areas, any deviation in equity shares across the
partition will create conflict.  For example, members holding greater shares in the oil rim than
in the gas cap would favor actions that promote oil recovery at the expense of gas.  This
could, for example, include opportunistic support for projects to re-inject produced gas into
the reservoir, as opposed to sending it to market.  It could also include opposition to projects,17
like construction of gas treatment plants, designed to extract natural gas liquids to be mixed
with oil for pipeline shipment.  Similarly, gas owners could promote excessive natural gas
production and early sales that would impair pressure maintenance in the reservoir and reduce
the recovery of oil.
Multi-Phase Units:  Primary vs. Secondary Production
In the case of multi-phase units, the reservoir partition corresponds to the transition
between primary and secondary recovery efforts. A consensus on efficient extraction from the
multi-phase unit requires that each owner hold a uniform share across phases.  Otherwise, an
owner who holds a relatively large interest in primary recovery would favor shifting a greater
proportion of extractive effort into the primary phase￿perhaps by obstructing efforts to
initiate the transition to secondary recovery methods.  Conversely, those members holding
relatively large interests in secondary recovery would favor a shortening of the primary phase,
or perhaps a less intensive primary recovery effort (e.g., wider well spacing).
In practice, each member’s share typically differs across phases, depending on how
each lease initially is expected to perform during primary and secondary production.  Due to
variations in geological conditions within the reservoir, the performance of any lease can vary
significantly across phases.
Different allocations across phases raise the question of whether the members employ
some alternative contract arrangements to mitigate the potential efficiency losses that would
result from discord.  The key provision in this regard appears to be an objective pre-
determination of the events that will trigger the transition from primary to secondary
recovery.  When a unit is originally formed, members agree that secondary recovery will be
initiated when reservoir production or alternatively, the gas/oil ratio, reaches a certain level,18
signifying a critical level of exhaustion of the original oil resource.  Gas production tends to
rise, relative to oil, as the reservoir is depleted.  The total production or gas/oil ratio triggers
are objective and based upon mutually agreed engineering assessments.  Moreover, the nature
of the trigger tends to automatically defeat any subsequent efforts to opportunistically
manipulate recovery efforts in either phase.
For example, the incentive of an owner with a relatively large share of secondary
production to minimize primary production is tempered because such action would, under the
agreed transition criterion, only extend the primary recovery period.  As primary production is
reduced, the anticipated rise in the gas/oil ratio is delayed, and this condition postpones the
transition to secondary recovery.  Thus, reliance on this type of fixed transition rule can be
understood as a contractual device designed to restore (approximately) the incentive
compatibility that would otherwise be destroyed by creation of the partition.
21  If the partition
did not exist, there would be no need or value in pre-committing to a fixed transition rule.
Through this contractual mechanism, the lease owners can align incentives for cooperative
behavior through the productive life of the reservoir.  Notice, however, that it is still
imperative even with the trigger that within each recovery phase each member holds a single
equity share.  If not, disputes would persist regarding the optimal plan for recovery within the
phase.
IV. Empirical Analysis.
A. Evidence from 60 Unit Operating Agreements
Our examination of the structure of Unit Operating Agreements suggests that the
following key features would tend to be observed in practice:
a).  A complete Unit Operating Agreement will have a profit-sharing formula that19
assigns costs and production in an equal manner for each of the parties to the agreement.
b).  The partitioning of a unit between production phases (multi-phase) and between
oil rim and gas cap (dual PAs) potentially results in incomplete contracts.  Proportionate cost
and production shares for the unit as a whole are less likely to be observed in these units than
in single-phase, single PA units.
c).  Dual PA units will have different individual cost and production shares for the unit
as a whole, and hence, be incomplete.
d)  If multi-phase units have individual cost and production shares that are equal at any
point in time, the use of a fixed transition rule from phase to phase will allow the unit contract
to be complete.
e).  Complete units will have routine production histories with little or no evidence of
discord and rent dissipation.
f).  Incomplete units will have discord among the operating interests and rent
dissipation will be observed.  Such behavior will be most pronounced for dual PA units.
The empirical investigation begins with an examination of 60 unit operating
agreements from oil and gas reservoirs in Alaska, Alberta, Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
New Mexico, Texas, and Wyoming.  Unit Operating Agreements often are placed on file with
the state regulatory agency, such as with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.  Other files
were made available to us from company records.  These operating agreements include many
important reservoirs in the United States and Canada, and the reservoirs represented range
from strictly oil or gas to both oil and gas and from relatively simple geological formations to
more complex ones.  Moreover, there is considerable variation in the number of parties
involved in the units, from two working interests in the Cole Creek, Wyoming Unit to 11320
working interest owners in the Empire Abo, New Mexico Unit.
22  The unit operating
agreements span a wide time range, including the July 3, 1934  Fourbear, Wyoming Unit and
more recent units, such as the May 1, 1992 Rocky Ford Upper Mannville F Pool Oil Unit,
Alberta.  Hence, we believe that the empirical record from this diverse sample of operating
agreements is reflective of the general pattern of unitization contracting.
Other studies indicate that regulatory environments across states, including that of the
federal government, affect the incidence of unit agreements.  Further, the size of company
holdings and whether or not companies are repeat contractors across many reservoirs
influence their willingness to agree to unitization.
23  Our examination focuses on a different
question.  Once parties write a unitization contract, will that contract have the characteristics
that are necessary to successfully align incentives, and how do geological/informational issues
affect the parties’ ability to write such contracts?
Table 1 here
Table 1 summarizes key aspects of the unit operating agreements: whether and how
each reservoir has been partitioned, whether members’ cost and production shares are
equalized at each point in time, and whether (in the case of multi-phase units) a trigger was
adopted ex ante to balance and control the transition from primary to secondary recovery.  As
shown in the table, 78 percent (47 of 60) of the Unit Operating Agreements include the
provisions that we have identified as being essential for incentive compatibility in a
unitization agreement. This finding underscores the importance of aligning the interests of the
parties behind a production plan that maximizes the value of the reservoir over the life of the
contract.   At the same time, 22 percent of the sample do not have the characteristics required
to ensure incentive compatibility throughout the life of the unit. We now turn to a closer21
examination of the individual units to see if the potential bargaining problems associated with
formation of the various types of units help explain the observed contracting patterns.
In Table 1, 27 of the 60 cases (45 percent) represent simple, unpartitioned units.  Of
the 33 partitioned units, 19 are multi-phase units and 11 are dual PA units.  In addition, 3 units
are hybrids, being partitioned into multiple production phases and separate gas/oil
participating areas. We see signficant differences between these categories.
First, among the group of unpartitioned units, all 27 cases satisfy the equal shares
criterion for incentive compatibility.  In each of these cases, where the geological formation
and development concepts were straightforward enough to allow the owners to pool and trade
all assets within a single category, the theoretical prescription of equal cost and production
shares throughout the unit was followed invariably.
The 19 multi-phase units also satisfy the equal shares criterion during each production
phase.  By design, these units were structured to permit variation in the owners’ shares
between phases, and in all but one case the units include an ex ante trigger to balance and
control the transition between phases.
24  Of the 11 dual PA units, however, only one case
satisfies the equal shares criterion.  These units represent reservoirs where the positioning of
individual lease holdings was skewed enough to produce an unbalanced distribution of oil and
gas among owners, and where the marketability of oil and gas resources differed so much in
kind that the owners could not establish common terms of trade.  Only in these conditions
would we expect the difficulties in bargaining over initial shares to loom so large that the
owners would adopt a contractual framework that actually jeopardizes the incentive
compatibility of the agreement.
25
We have finally the 3 hybrid cases that involve both spatial and temporal partitions of22
the unit.  These units incorporate contractual features from both types:  they all include ex
ante triggers to balance and control the transition between primary and secondary recovery
phases, but also they all involve skewed and disparate gas and oil holdings that the owners
were unable to pool among themselves.  These hybrid units do not have the requisite sharing
requirements for incentive compatibility, and hence, closely resemble the dual PA units in our
sample.
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Why would the parties write a contract with provisions that create potential conflicts
of interest?   Previous research on unitization contracting has shown how difficult it is to
reach agreement in general to unitize oil fields.  Wiggins and Libecap (1985) showed that
negotiations took from four to nine years in the seven units they examined.  Further, in five of
those seven, only partial units were formed because not all parties could agree on the sharing
formula.  This general contracting problem explains why unitization overall is less common in
the United States than one would expect, considering only the benefits of agreement and not
the corresponding negotiating costs.  The evidence presented here reveals more precisely the
kinds of problems that oil and gas firms face in negotiating unit contracts.
The analytical framework suggests that negotiating parties will have greatest
difficulty reaching agreement on lease values and, hence, unit shares when holdings of oil and
gas are highly skewed. Thus, we observe units partitioned into dual participating areas when
firms have concentrated holdings of oil or gas.  To illustrate we outline the owners’ shares in
the oil rim and gas cap PAs in the Prudhoe Bay Unit of Alaska in Table 2.
Table 2 here
When ownership across firms is concentrated in oil or gas, formation of a complete
unit will require that large volumes of oil be traded for gas among firms.  It is hard to23
negotiate that trade if there is uncertainty about the value of gas production.  Uncertainty in
valuing skewed holdings in gas and oil leads to bargaining disputes in arriving on a single
share formula.  As a fall back, firms can more easily agree on the valuation of their holdings
within more homogeneous sections of the reservoir.  The result, however, is the creation of
dual participating areas with distinct share formulas. Although such units agreements are not
complete, the parties may chose those contracts over the alternative of no unit agreement.
The reason that multiple phases appear not to be a serious obstacle to negotiating share
formulas is that the firms are dealing primarily with differences in quantity (between primary
and secondary production) not kind (oil and gas).  Accordingly, there is less uncertainty
involved in estimating and agreeing to the value of unit shares within each phase, especially
when phases are inaugurated by a pre-set and uncontroversial trigger. The parties have
another important incentive to agree to collective action beyond solving the common-pool
problem.  Absent a unit to coordinate injection and production, effective reservoir-wide
secondary recovery typically is not possible, and the economic life of the reservoir will be
drastically shortened.
Another contributing factor to contracting success in multi-phase versus dual PA units
could be that individual share differences across phases typically are smaller than differences
across oil and gas holdings in gas cap reservoirs. We hypothesize that when firms have
similar shares across partitions it will be easier for them to reach agreement on a unit-wide
profit sharing formula.  The reasoning is that they will have less at stake in moving from one
partition (participating area or phase) to another and hence, be more flexible in unit
negotiations.
To empirically examine this issue, we calculated the absolute difference in each firm’s24
share across partitions in dual oil and gas PAs and multi-phase units.  We have data on
individual firm shares in each phase or participating area, as relevant, for nine dual PA units
and for five multi-phase units.
27 The mean of the absolute share differences is 1.04 percentage
points (S.D. 1.75) for 129 firms in the five multi-phase units and over three times greater at
3.41 percentage points (S.D. 9.60) for 157 firms in the nine dual PA units.  A t-test of the
difference in the means allows for rejection of the hypothesis that the means are the same.
28
Differences in the productive value of leases within the unit across phases are smaller than are
the differences due to the geological concentration of oil and gas deposits when there are gas
caps.
B.  The Case of Prudhoe Bay.
If we are correct that equal individual cost and production shares effectively align
incentives, then units with those characteristics should have comparatively routine, non-
controversial production histories. Tests of this claim are difficult to perform because of the
limited data available.  Disputes within private unit operating agreements generally are
resolved through mediation with no public record.  Only the most hotly contested agreements
will involve litigation and/or appeals to state regulatory agencies.
Our search of court cases involving the units included in Table 1 provides a lengthy
record for the Prudhoe Bay Unit (PBU) in Alaska.
29 Examination of regulatory records at the
Texas Railroad Commission and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission provides little
indication of protracted conflict among the working interests within other units in these two
states. By contrast, the public records of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(AOGCC) clearly show that the Prudhoe Bay Unit Operating Agreement has had a history of
intense and costly disputes among the working interests.25
The Prudhoe Bay field was discovered in early 1968.  Unit negotiations began in
1969, and the first unit agreement was not completed until 1977.
30  It has been revised several
times since then.
31 One serious problem facing the negotiators was how to value the natural
gas in the gas cap, where ARCO and Exxon’s leases happened to be clustered.  Most of the oil
was located in a zone below the gas cap, in a region referred to as the oil rim where BP’s
leases were concentrated. Given the remote position of the field and the absence of a natural
gas pipeline, it was not clear whether gas would be sold in large amounts or kept in the
reservoir to maintain natural subsurface pressure to assist in oil extraction.
Since the economic value of the gas resources was highly speculative, the parties
sought in vain for a formula that would allocate to each party a fixed share of all
hydrocarbons produced from the reservoir.
32 After eight years of bargaining, an agreement
was reached among the lease owners that designated two separate participating areas within
the reservoir: each lease owner was allocated a fixed share of oil rim production and costs and
a separate and numerically different share of gas cap production and costs.  As Table 2 shows
BP, for example, was allocated 51 percent of production from the oil rim, but only 14 percent
of production from the gas cap.
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Under this arrangement, gas cap owners became residual claimants to gas cap profits
and oil rim owners became residual claimants to oil rim profits.  None of the parties was made
a residual claimant to the unit-wide profits. The formation of dual, competing participating
areas within the single reservoir brought conflicts of interest, opportunistic behavior, and an
intense battle over how the reservoir would be developed.
At the heart of the conflicts has been the inevitable competition between gas and oil
lease owners.  From the outset, the lease owners have been aware that the sale and removal of26
gas from the reservoir would impair ultimate recovery of oil because of the consequent loss of
reservoir pressure.  That cost falls disproportionately on BP (as majority owner of the oil rim).
On the other hand, any gas re-injection program designed to maintain reservoir pressure or
otherwise enhance the recovery of oil has the potential to divert marketable gas that could
perhaps be sold elsewhere, and this burden falls disproportionately on ARCO and Exxon.
These two companies have favored processing the gas that was produced in association with
oil to extract as much natural gas liquids (NGL) as could be blended with oil for shipment and
sale down the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.  BP has favored processing the gas to produce miscible
injectant (MI), which could be re-injected into the reservoir to enhance the recovery of
remaining oil.
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The ensuing competition among the respective firms illustrates the costs incurred
when interests are not aligned.  For example, on February 9, 1995 ARCO (acting as operator
of facilities in the eastern region of the reservoir) unilaterally increased the production of
NGLs for shipment down the pipeline.  To offset ARCO’s initiative, BP (acting as operator of
facilities in the western region of the reservoir) unilaterally restricted the volume of NGLs
that it blended with the stream of crude oil entering the pipeline, thereby leaving the total
shipment of NGLs from the Prudhoe Bay Unit unchanged.  In retaliation, ARCO then
increased its own blending of NGLs into the crude oil stream, but BP again took offsetting
action.  In addition, BP filed a claim in the Alaska Superior Court that would permit the
company to take its share of reservoir production in kind, thereby preventing ARCO from
using that oil as a vehicle for increased blending of NGLs.  BP also filed a request with the
Alaska Public Utilities Commission for permission to construct a new pipeline within the
reservoir to segregate and convey its share of the oil for shipment off the Unit, prior to any27
further blending of NGLs.  The pipeline was not necessary to develop the unit, only to protect
BP’s interests.
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It is obvious that none of these actions was designed to increase the economic value of
the PBU as a whole; indeed, these actions by the various parties in their own private interest
have served to dissipate the rents of the unit.  It was not the depletion of reserves that set
Prudhoe crude oil production into decline in 1988.  Rather the turning point in the life of the
reservoir was caused by lack of agreement on who would pay for facilities to handle the
growing fraction of gas that was produced in association with oil as the reservoir matured. 
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Although the parties have disagreed publicly about the ultimate cost of the contested
plan to sell rather than re-inject the produced NGL, the potential impact is apparently
significant.  By BP’s estimate, maximum re-injection of the gas would boost ultimate
recovery of liquid hydrocarbons by some 150-200 million barrels.  In BP’s view, ARCO’s
proposal to divert a portion of the injected gas for sale as NGL would decrease ultimate
recovery by 60-80 million barrels.
37  To put these numbers in perspective, consider that any
single oil reservoir with as much as 100 million barrels of recoverable reserves is considered a
“giant” relative to the size distribution of all U.S. oil and gas reservoirs.
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V. Concluding Remarks.
In this paper we have extended the theory and empirical analysis of unitization
agreements that address common-pool losses in oil and gas production.   We have isolated the
key elements of the Unit Operating Agreement that are necessary to align incentives among
the working interests in order to maximize the economic value of the reservoir.  We also
identified the geological/informational conditions that could impede agreement on complete
unit contracts and lead instead to the writing of different contracts where production and28
investment incentives would differ among firms.  Such differences would lead potentially to
conflicts and behavior that dissipated reservoir rents. Evidence from 60 unit operating
agreements has been used to examine implications of the theoretical framework. Additionally,
the case study of the Prudhoe Bay Unit illustrates the discord and waste that occurs when the
interests of the parties are not aligned.
The analysis highlights the importance of achieving incentive compatibility in drafting
unit contracts and the corresponding self-enforcement of cooperative group behavior such
contracts can bring.  Agreeing upon a profit-sharing formula that binds the interests of the
parties over the long term, however, is not always possible.  This condition appears to be
particularly evident when holdings on the reservoir are heterogeneous with respect to kind—
when some parties own primarily oil and others primarily gas.  Disagreement on the terms of
exchange of gas for oil typically result in the partitioning of the reservoir into distinct and
competing participating areas with separate production and cost allocation formulas.  In
effect, the parties become separate groups of share holders in segments of the same oil and
gas reservoir.  The potential for wasteful competition is clear.
Firms write unit contracts with dual PAs when there are very skewed holdings of oil
and gas within a reservoir and when agreement on a single participating area and profit-
sharing formula is not forthcoming.  State regulatory agencies then are faced with a trade
off—endorsing a unit agreement with a dual PA in order to facilitate earlier, albeit
incomplete, cooperative development of the reservoir or forcing the parties to continue to
negotiate until a complete unit agreement can be written.  Hence, regulatory agencies must
weigh the costs of conflicting incentives and associated rent dissipation with dual PA units
against the costs of delaying the formation of a unit until a complete, incentive-compatible29
agreement can be written.  This latter case might mean delaying reservoir development and
production.  The outcome of balancing of these costs likely will vary from case to case.
Nevertheless, this paper has made clear for the first time the contracting problems and costs
that are linked to dual PA units.  This information can be of use in the regulatory process.
Our analysis has also shown that by contrast, multi-phase units do not typically have
the same incentive problems found in dual PA units.  When production is partitioned across
primary and secondary recovery periods, with different sharing formulas during each period,
Unit Operating Agreements still have profit-sharing arrangements for the whole unit during
each period.  The transition from one phase to the next is managed  through the use of a preset
contractual trigger, and there is little apparent effort by the owners to opportunistically
maneuver across phases.  In effect, the parties are share holders in the entire reservoir during
each phase, although their shares may differ by small amounts from one phase to another.
The theory and analysis presented here provides new insights into the process of
unitization and the writing of oil and gas contracts.  We are not arguing that cooperative
agreements for other empirical settings, such as crop share contracts, have the same profit-
sharing characteristics we have described here.
39  In particular, the geological/informational
aspects responsible for the partitioning units in our sample may be unique to the oil and gas
context.  Rather, our examination of oil and gas unitization contracts illustrates the important
role that the content of contracts can make in aligning incentives ex ante to reduce
enforcement costs and promote wealth maximizing behavior ex post.  Further, the analysis of
unitization contracting points out the dangers of partitioning heterogeneous parties into more
homogeneous subgroups during contract negotiation.  Although, such clustering may facilitate
agreement within the subgroup, the agreed-to provisions may not be incentive compatible for30
the entire group.  Hence, the overall contract will be incomplete and faced with compliance
problems.31
                                                       
1   There is a considerable literature on the common-pool problem in oil and gas production
and efforts to counter it.  See, for example McDonald (1971), Libecap and Wiggins (1984),
Weaver (1986), Smith (1987), Lueck and Schenewerk (1996), and Libecap 1998).
2 Units generally apply to common reservoirs of hydrocarbons.  An oil and gas “field” may
have multiple, separate reservoirs from different geologic formations.   Typically, separate
reservoirs have separate units because there is no common-pool problem across them.
3 Oil Weekly (April 13, 1942; May 3, 1943). The Oil and Gas Journal (December 7, 1964)
predicted that unitization would raise oil recovery by 130 million barrels on the Fairway field.
The increase is valued at over $200 million using prices compiled by Manthy (1978: 111).
See also, McDonald (1971: 24-5, 237).  The benefits of unitization  are emphasized in unit
documents.  For example, see Anshutz East, Wyoming Unit Agreement, December 1982, on
file with the authors.
4 Wiggins and Libecap (1985), Smith (1987), and Lueck and Schenewerk (1996) examine
some of the bargaining issues faced by unit negotiators.
5 Williamson (1975: 30, 65-94) discusses incentive issues in contract enforcement.
6 Unit Operating Agreements typically allocate volumes of produced substances, as opposed
to revenue, among the parties to the contract.  A fixed allocation of unit revenues would
require the joint marketing of output, which may raise anti-trust issues that companies would
be anxious to avoid.
7   For example, see the Model Form of Unit Agreement provided by the American Petroleum
Institute, third edition, January 1970.
8  There may be multiple secondary phases, and the type of injection--water, natural gas,
carbon dioxide, depends upon the nature of the reservoir.32
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 Exxon, for example, has recently applied as operator of the Point Thomson Unit in Alaska
for the state’s permission to add one of its adjacent leases to the unit, thereby raising its
working interest while proportionately decreasing the interests of other owners.  See
Petroleum News Alaska (September 28, 1998: 3).
10   See the Model Unit Operating Agreement for Statutory Unitization provided by the
American Petroleum Institute, first edition, March 1974.
11  The problem of asset specificity arises because significant investments will be made in the
unit that have value or most value only under an operational unit.  Hence, those parties who
make the investment are vulnerable to holdups by the other parties to capture some of the
rents.
12   As described by Klein and Murphy (1997: 417), “the self-enforcing range measures the
extent to which market conditions can change, thereby altering the gains to one or the other
party from nonperformance, without precipitating nonperformance.”
13 The common-pool problem would be circumvented if landowners agreed to coordinate
production.  In cases where surface ownership is large enough to cover all or nearly all of an
entire reservoir, unitized production is routine.  Where surface holdings are more fragmented,
the problem increases.  For discussion, see Libecap and Wiggins (1984).
14 For general discussion of the common-pool problem using fisheries to illustrate the issues,
see Gordon (1954) and Cheung (1970). Smith (1987) focuses on the problems of oil
production from a common pool.
15   Operating firms typically lease the mineral rights from surface land owners, and they often
have multiple sectors.  For discussion of the proportionate allocation of production and costs,
see Plan of Unitization, East Binger (Marchand) Unit, Caddo County, Oklahoma, Article 17.
See also, Article 11.1 of the American Petroleum Institute, Model Forms for Voluntary and
Statutory Unit Operating Agreements, fourth and second editions, respectively, June 1, 1993.33
                                                                                                                                                                            
16   There may be differences in opinion regarding geological conditions or technical
capabilities that affect the production plan. The single-equity provision, however, means that
such differences will not arise due to strategic behavior.
17 For example, see Article 4.4 of the Anschutz Ranch East Unit Operating Agreement on file
with the authors.
18   Libecap and Wiggins (1985).
19 Fitzgerald and Pokalsky (1995: 196).
20  Partitions within units also may be made to segregate highly permeable sections of a
reservoir (where the underlying resources will be easier to recover in primary recovery) from
sections that have low permeability but are useful for secondary recovery.
21 We are grateful to the anonymous referee who suggested this interpretation.
22   Cole Creek Unit Operating Agreement, January 30, 1953;  Empire Abo Unit Operating
Agreement, October 1, 1972.
23   Libecap and Wiggins (1985) and Wiggins and Libecap (1985).
24  The Burke Ranch Unit Operating Agreement does not indicate an explicit trigger, although
it may have been part of an attachment that is missing from our files.
25 Examination of the production and cost sharing rules for the Clive D-3 Unit in Alberta
illustrates the incentive problem found in dual PA units.  Effectively, the oil interests share in
the oil reserves and costs and the gas interests share in the gas reserves and costs as if these
were distinct entities within the unit.  But of course, they are not.  There are cost externalities
from gas production for oil producers and vice versa.  Under this arrangement, the parties will34
                                                                                                                                                                            
have to concern themselves with competing maximization problems and strategies, rather than
the value of the unit as a whole.  Our subsequent discussion of the Prudhoe Bay Unit indicates
where this may lead.
26 To formally test for the statistical relationship between the frequency of observing an equal
cost/production allocation rule and the frequency of observing dual PA units, we created a
2x2 contingency table.  A chi-square statistic with 1 degree of freedom was constructed with a
calculated value, c
2 = 54.53.  With a critical value of 6.64, we can reject the null hypothesis
that observing the equal equity allocation rule and observing a dual PA unit are independent at
the 99% confidence level.  This result supports our argument that dual PA units are unlikely
to have equal cost and production sharing rules.  For discussion of our approach, see
Dudewicz and Mishra (1988: 533).
27   The nine dual PA units are Prudhoe Bay, Virginia Hills Belloy, Namao Blairmore, Bonnie
Glen, Minnehick, Harmattan-Elkton, Harmattan-East, Rocky Ford, and Clive D-3.  The five
multi-phase units are Graham Deese, Wildhorse, Grass Creek Curtis, County Line, and
Collums.
28   The t-statistic is –3.03 (assuming unequal variances) and the critical value is 1.97.  The
results are similar if Prudhoe Bay is dropped from the analysis.  The mean share difference is
2.98 with a standard deviation of 9.12.  The mean share difference for the dual PA units is still
about three times that of the multi-phase units.
29 A useful description of the Prudhoe Bay reservoir is found in Szabo and Meyers (1993).
30 A letter of intent to unitize was signed by the principal lease owners in August 1969.
Negotiations continued on and off until final agreement was reached in April 1977.
31 At least seven significant amendments to the Prudhoe Bay Unit Operating Agreement were
adopted in the 1980s and 1990s largely to address disputes over natural gas and oil valuation,
investment, and production.  At times, outside arbitrators, the courts, and various state35
                                                                                                                                                                            
regulatory agencies were used to compel these changes.
32 Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC), (April 12, 1996: 238, 289, 951-
56).
33 Costs assigned to each participating area were allocated among owners on the same basis as
production.
34 AOGCC Conservation Order No. 360 (Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, Prudhoe Oil Pool), August
9, 1995 (Revised November 3, 1995), paragraphs 73-74.  (Hereafter referred to as “AOGCC
Order 360.”)
35 AOGCC, Order 360, 1995, paragraphs 135-136.
36 See Szabo and Myers (1993: 4).
37 AOGCC, Order 360, 1995, paragraphs 59 and 62.
38 See Nehring (1981: 13-15).
39  Allen and Lueck (1993), for example, examine the conditions under which profit or output
sharing is optimal in crop share contracts.Table 1


















Anshutz East ￿ M ￿ Salem Flood ￿ M ￿
Benton ￿ U Salt Creek S. ￿ U
Big Stone Gas ￿ U Seeligson ￿ U
Birch Creek ￿ U Sharon Ridge
Canyon
￿ U
Brady Deep ￿ U S. Swan Hills ￿ M ￿
Burke Ranch ￿ M Southwest
Homer
￿ M ￿





￿ M ￿ Sycamore ￿ M ￿
County Line ￿ M ￿ W. Cement
Medrano
￿ U
E. Binger ￿ U W. Edmond ￿ U
E. Burke Ranch ￿ M ￿ W. Elmwood ￿ M ￿
E. Salt Creek ￿ U Wildhorse ￿ M ￿
Edson Cardium
B
￿ U Big Sand
Draw
￿ U
Empire Abo ￿ M ￿ Cole Creek ￿ U
Fox Deese-
Springer
￿ M ￿ Forebear ￿ U
Goldsmith S.
Andreas
￿ U W. Poison
Spider
￿ U
Graham Deese ￿ M ￿ Canyon Reef ￿ U
Grass Creek
Curtis






Hartzog Draw ￿ U Virginia Hills
Belloy
D
Joffrey D-2 ￿ U Alliso Canyon M,D ￿
Karon ￿ D Clive D-2 D
Little Buffalo ￿ U Clive D-3A D
Milroy ￿ M ￿ Harmattan E. D
Nipisi Gilwood ￿ M ￿ Harmattan
Elkton
D





￿ U Rocky Ford D
Pembina
Ostracod
￿ U Bonnie Glen
D-3A
D





￿ U Prudhoe Bay D
†U = Unpartitioned, M = Multi-Phase, D = Dual PA.* Equal Cost/Production Share at any point in time.Table 2
Firm Shares in Oil and Gas in Dual Participating Areas, Prudhoe Bay Unit




Small holders 5 2Bibliography
Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC), 1995, “Conservation Order
No. 360 (Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, Prudhoe Oil Pool), August 9, 1995 (Revised
November 3, 1995), Anchorage.
_______________, 1996, Transcript of Public Hearing Re: Prudhoe Bay Unit—
Liquid/Miscible Natural Gas Injectant, April 12, 1996, Anchorage.
Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck, 1993, “Transaction Costs and the Design of
Cropshare Contracts,” Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (1):  78-100.
American Petroleum Institute, 1970, Model Form of Unit Agreement, January, 1970,
third edition. Washington D.C.
_______________, 1974, Model Unit Operating Agreement for Statutory Unitization,
March, 1974, first edition, Washington D.C.
_______________, 1993, Model Forms for Voluntary and Statutory Unit Operating
Agreements, June 1993, fourth and second editions, respectively,  Washington
D.C.
Bain, Joe, 1947,  The Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry, Part III,
Berkeley:  University of California Press.
Fitzgerald, Jay and Joseph T. Pokalsky, 1995, “The Natural Gas Market,” in Managing
Energy Price Risk, edited by Robert Jamison, London: Risk Publications.
Klein, Benjamin, 1996, “Why Hold-Ups Occur:  The Self-Enforcing Range of
Contractual Relationships,” Economic Inquiry, 34(3):444-463.
_______________ and Kevin M. Murphy, 1997, “Vertical Integration as a Self-
Enforcing Contractual Arrangement,” American Economic Review, 87(2): 415-
420.
Libecap, Gary D., 1989, Contracting for Property Rights, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
_______________, 1998, “Unitization,” New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and
Economics, Peter Newman, ed.,  New York:  Oxford University Press.
Libecap, Gary D. and Steven N. Wiggins, 1984, “Contractual Responses to the Common
Pool:  Prorationing of Crude Oil Production” American Economic Review, 74:
87-98._______________, 1985, “The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation:
The Case of Oil Field Unitization,” Journal of Political Economy, 93: 690-714.
Lueck, Dean and P. Schenewerk, 1996, “An Economic Analysis of Unitized and Non-
Unitized Production,” Society of Petroleum Engineers, Paper No. SPE 36577,
October 1996.
MacAvoy, Paul W., 1983, Energy Policy:  An Economic Analysis, New York:  W.W.
Norton.
Manthy, Robert S., 1978, Natural Resource Commodities—A Century of Statistics,
Baltimore:  Resources for the Future and Johns Hopkins University Press
McDonald, Stephen, 1971, Petroleum Conservation in the United States, Baltimore:
Resources for the Future.
Murray, Paula C. and Frank B. Cross, 1992, “The Case for a Texas Compulsory
Unitization Statute,”  St. Mary’s Law Journal, 23:  1099-1154.
Nehring, Richard, 1981, The Discovery of Significant Oil and Gas Fields in the United
States, Santa Monica, CA:  The Rand Corporation.
Oil and Gas Journal, various issues.
Oil Weekly, various issues.
Petroleum News Alaska, various issues.
Smith, James L., 1987, “The Common Pool, Bargaining, and the Rule of Capture,”
Economic Inquiry 25: 631-44.
Szabo, D.J. and K. O. Meyers,  1993, “Prudhoe Bay:  Development History and Future
Potential,” Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper No. 26053.
Weaver, Jacqueline Lang, 1986, Unitization of Oil and Gas Fields in Texas: A Study of
Legislative, Administrative, and Judicial Policies,  Washington D.C.: Resources
for the Future.
Wiggins, Steven N. and Gary D. Libecap, 1985, “Oil Field Unitization: Contractual
Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information,” American Economic Review
75: 376-385.
Williamson, Oliver E., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free Press.